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The Supreme Court How It Was, How It Is
William H. Rehnquist
How the Court Does Its Work Oral
Argument
Lawyers often ask me whether oral
argument "really makes a difference."
Often the question is asked with an
undertone of skepticism, if not cynicism,
intimating that the judges have really
made up their minds before they ever
come on the bench and oral argument is
pretty much of a formality. My answer is
that, speaking for myself, it does make a
difference: I think that in a significant
majority of the cases in which I have
heard oral argument, I have left the bench
feeling different about a case than I did
when I came on the bench. The challenge
is seldom a full one-hundred-and-eighty-
degree swmig, and I find that it is most
likely to occur in cases involving areas of
law with which I am least familiar.
There is more to oral argument than
meets the eye - or the ear. Nominally, it
is the hour allotted to the opposing
counsel to argue their respective positions
to the judges who are to decide the case.
Even if it were in fact largely a formality, I
think it would still have the value that
many public ceremonies have: It forces
the judges who are going to decide the
case and the lawyers who represent the
clients whose fates will be affected by the
outcome of the decision to look at one
another for an hour, and talk back and
forth about how the case should be
decided.
But if an oral advocate is effective, how he
presents his position during oral argument
will have something to do with how the
case comes out. Most judges have
tentative views of the case when they
come on the bench, and it would be
strange if they did not. [ ... ]
But a second important function of oral
argument can be gleaned from the fact
that it is the only time before conference
discussion of the case later in the week
when all of the judges are expected to sit
on the bench and concentrate on one
particular case. The judges' questions,
although nominally directed to the
attorney arguing the case, may in fact be
for the benefit of their colleagues. A good
oral advocate will recognize this fact, and
make use of it during his presentation.
Questions may reveal that a particular
judge has a misunderstanding as to an
important fact in the case, or perhaps
reads a given precedent differently from
the way in which the attorney thinks it
should be read. If the judge simply sat
silent during the oral argument, there
would be no opportunity for the lawyer to
correct the factual nusinpression or to
state his reasons for interpreting the
particular case the way he does. Each
attorney arguing a case ought to be much,
much more familiar with the facts and the
law governing it than the judges who are
to decide it. Each of the nine members of
our Court must prepare for argument in
four cases a day, on three successive days
of each week. One can do his level best
to digest form the briefs and other reading
what he believes necessary to decide the
case, and still find himself falling short in
one aspect or another of either the law or
the facts. Oral argument can cure these
shortcomings.
On occasion of course we get lawyers
who do not come up to even the
minimum level of competence in
representing their client before our Court,
either from lack of training and ability or,
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even worse, lack of preparation. But the
great majority of advocates who appear
before us exceed the minimum level of
competence one might expect, and most
of them are far above average in the
profession. In my day as a law clerk, it
seemed to me that criminal defendants
were not as capably represented as they
might have been, because at that time the
so-called "criminal lawyer" was often
possessed of a second-rate education and
second-rate abilities. But that is no longer
true today with the proliferation of public
defender and similar offices which attract
bright and able younger lawyers. The
truly outstanding advocate before our
Court is still a great rarity. * the lawyer
who knows the law, knows the facts, can
speak articulately, but who knows that at
bottom first-rate oral advocacy is
something more than stringing together as
many well-constructed relevant sentences
as is possible in one half hour.
We who sit on the bench day after day to
hear lawyers practice this art are bound to
become, whether we like it or not,
connoisseurs of its practitioners. Rather
than try to draw up a long list of do's and
don'ts for the oral advocate, I have tried
in the following paragraphs to catalog
some of the species of practitioners who
have argued before the Court in my time.
The first is the lector, and he does just
what his name implies: He reads his
argument. The worst case of the lector is
the lawyer who actually reads the brief
itself; this behavior is so egregious that it
is rarely seen. But milder cases read
paraphrases of the brief, although they
tram themselves to look up from their
script occasionally to meet the judges'
eyes. Questions from the judges, instead
of being used as an opportunity to
advance one's own arguments by
response, are looked upon as an
interruption in the advocate's delivery of
his "speech," and the lawyer after
answering the question returns to the
printed page at exactly where he left off;
returns, one often feels, with the phrase
"as I was saying" implied if not expressed.
One feels on occasion that at the
conclusion of his argument the lector will
say, "Thus endeth the lesson for today."
The lector is very seldom a good oral
advocate. It would be foolish for a lawyer
to stand before an appellate court with
nothing written out to guide his
presentation, but the use of notes for
reference conveys a far different effect
from the reading of a series of typed
pages. The ultimate purpose of oral
argument, from the point of view of the
advocate, is to work his way into the
judge's consciousness and make the judge
think about the things that the advocate
wishes him to think about. One of the
best ways to begin this process is to
establish eye contact with as many of the
judges as possible, and this simply can't be
done while you are reading your
presentation.
An oral advocate should welcome
questions from the bench, because a
question shows that at least one judge is
inviting him to say what he thinks about a
particular aspect of the case. A question
also has the valuable psychological effect
of bringing a second voice into the
performance, so that the minds of judges,
which may have momentarily strayed
from the lawyer's presentation, are
brought back simply by this different
sound. But the lector is apt to receive
fewer questions than a better advocate just
because he seems less willing than other
lawyers to take the trouble to carefully
answer the questions. When he has
finished reading a presentation to the
Court, all he has done is to state a logical
and reasoned basis for the position he has
taken on behalf of his client before the
Court; but this much should have been
accomplished in his briefs. If oral
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argument provides nothing more than a
summary of the brief in monologue, it is
of very little value to the Court.
The second species of oral advocate who
comes to my mind is what I shall call the
debating champion. He has an excellent
grasp of his theory of the case and the
arguments supporting it, and with the aid
of a few notes and memorization can
depart from the printed page at will. But
he is so full of his subject, and so desirous
of demonstrating this to others, that he
doesn't listen carefully to questions. He is
the authority, and every question from the
bench is presumed to call for one of
several stock answers, none of which may
be particularly helpful to the inquiring
judge. He pulls out all the stops,
welcomes questions, and exudes
confidence; when he has finished and sat
down, one judge may turn to another and
say, "Boy, he certainly knows his subject."
But simply showing how well you know
your subject is not the same as convincing
doubters by first carefully listening to their
questions and then carefully answering
them.
The third species of oral advocate I shall
simply call "Casey Jones." This lawyer
has a complete grasp of his subject matter,
does listen to questions, tnies to answer
them carefully and does not read from any
prepared text. He is a good oral advocate,
but falls short of being a top-notch oral
advocate because he forgets about the
limitations of those he is trying to
convince. The reason I call him Casey
Jones is because he is like n engineer on a
nonstop train - he will not stop to pick up
passengers along the way.
He know the complexities of his subject,
and knows that if he were permitted to do
so he could easily spend an hour and a
half arguing this particular case without
ever repeating himself. He is probably
right. For this reason, in order to get as
much as possible of his argument into half
an hour, he speaks very rapidly, without
realizing that when he is arguing before a
bench of nine people, each of them will
require a little time to assimilate what he is
saying. If the lawyer goes nonstop
throughout the thirty minutes without
even a pause, except for questions, even
able and well-prepared judges are going to
be left behind. To become a truly first-
rate oral advocate, this lawyer must simply
learn to leave the secondary points to the
brief, to slow down his pace of speaking,
and to remember that the lawyer who
makes six points, of which three are
remembered by the judges, is a better
lawyer than a lawyer who makes twelve
points, of which only one is remembered
by the judges.
Next we come to the spellbinder, who is
fortunately today much more of a rara avis
than even in the days when I was a law
clerk. The spellbinder has a good voice,
and a good deal of that undefinable
something called "presence" which
enables him to talk with the Court rather
than talk to the Court. This species of
oral advocate has much going for him, but
he tends to let his natural assets be a
substitute for any careful analysis of the
legal issues in the case. He is the other
side of the coin from Casey Jones, who
won't let up on legal analysis long enough
to give the judges even a mental breathing
spell. The spellbinder's magniloquent
presentation of the big picture could be
copied in part with profit by Casey Jones,
but the thorough attention to the subject
of the latter could be copied by the
spellbinder. The spellbinder's ultimate
weapon is his peroration, or at least so he
thinks. A florid peroration, exhorting the
Court either to save the Bill of Rights
from the government or to save the
government from the Bill of Rights,
simply does not work very well in our
Court.
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These are but a few of the varied species
of oral advocates that have come before
our Court in my time. If we were to
combine the best in all of them, we would
of course have the All American oral
advocate. If the essential element of the
case turns on how the statute is worded,
she will pause and slowly read the crucial
sentence or paragraph. She will realize
that there is an element of drama in an
oral argument, a drama in which for half
an hour she is the protagonist. But she
also realizes that her spoken lines must
have substantive legal meaning, and does
not waste her relatively short time with
observations that do not advance the
interest of her client. She has a theme and
a plan for her argument, but is quite
willing to pause and listen carefully to
questions. The questions may reveal that
the judge is ignorant, stupid, or both, but
even such questions should have the best
possible answer. She avoids table
pounding and other hortatory
mannerisms, but she realizes equally well
that an oral argument on behalf of one's
client requires controlled enthusiasm and
not an impression of fin de siecle ennui.
* * r
Copyright 0 1987 by William H
Rehnquist
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Lawyering for the Government- Politics, Polemics & Principle.
47 Ohio St L.J. 595
1986
Rex E. Lee
Let me begin by reviewing a few numbers.
The reason that the Solicitor General of
the United States has the greatest
lawyering job in the world is that one of
his two responsibilities is to handle
litigation for only one client, the United
States of America, before only one court,
the United States Supreme Court. In
other words, he represents the world's
most interesting client before the world's
most interesting court.
The Supreme Court in any given year will
consider about 160 cases on the merits.
The Solicitor General's client is a party in
about sixty of those cases. In addition, his
client. will participate as arnicus cunae
both in the briefing and the oral argument
of about twenty-five or thirty more cases.
Those numbers alone render unique the
relationship of this particular little twenty-
three member law firm to the only court
before which it practices. I know of no
other court of general jurisdiction in the
world in which one law firm appears in
more than half of its cases.
There are some other numbers that make
this relationship even more remarkable.
Firt, the national average for winning
cases before the United States Supreme
Court is fifty percent. (Now if you poll
the lawyers it will come out slightly higher
than fifty percent, but I will assure that by
any objective measurement it is fifty
percent.) But this particular firm rather
consistently wins seventy percent or more.
Next, the national average for persuading
the Court to consider the case on the
merits -- that is to note jurisdiction of
appeals or to grant certiorari -- is about
three percent to five percent. For the
Solicitor General's office, it is somewhere
between sixty percent and seventy
percent. A final example, and perhaps the
most significant of all, is this: About two
dozen or more times each year, the United
States Supreme Court will enter an order
asking the Solicitor General to express the
views of the United States in a case in
which the United States is not involved as
a party.
Those numbers are only part of the story.
Beyond the numbers there is a widely
held, and I believe substantially accurate,
impression that the Solicitor General's
office provides the Court from one
administration to another -- and largely
without regard to either the political party
or the personality of the particular
Solicitor General -- with advocacy which
is more objective, more dispassionate,
more competent, and more respectful of
the Court as an institution than it gets
from any other lawyer or group of
lawyers.
The relationship I have just described is
one that has great advantages for both
institutions. The advantage to the Court
is that in more than half of its cases it has
a highly-skilled lawyer on whom it can
count consistently for dependable analysis
rendered against the background of an
unusual understanding and respect for the
Court as an institution.
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The benefit to the Solicitor General and
his clients is obvious. What lawyer would
not value a relationship in which the court
before which he appears with frequency,
asks him, "what should we do about this
case in which you are not involved?" I
think that it is not only proper for the
Solicitor General to use the adversarial
advantages that result from that kind of
relationship; it would be a breach of
obligation to the President who appointed
him to fail to do so. But it must be done
with discretion, with discrimination, and
with sensitivity, lest the reservoir of
credibility which is the source of this
special advantage be diminished, with
adverse consequences not only to the
government's ability to win cases, but also
to an important institution of government
itself.
[Rex E. Lee served as Solicitor General
during the Reagan Administration]
Copyright a 1986 Ohio State Law Journal
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Defending Congress
79 N.CL. Rev. 1073
2001
Seth P. Waxman
Like judges, the Solicitor General is a
reactive creature; every decision he makes
comes in the context of a specific request
from a Cabinet department, an
independent agency, a United States
Attorney, or a litigating division of the
Department of Justice. In every instance,
the process begins with a written analysis
and recommendation, which is then
circulated to every government
component that might conceivably have
an interest in the matter. These
components in turn prepare their own
analyses and share them with each other. I
recall cases from my tenure in which as
many as a dozen different agencies and
components have expressed views.
After all of these memos are in, an
Assistant to the Solicitor General prepares
an independent analysis and
recommendation; a Deputy writes
another, and the entire package lands on
the Solicitor General's desk for decision.
Ordinarily, between five and ten of these
recommendation packages arrive every
day. Most are reasonably straightforward,
but sometimes the recommendations
differ widely. Meetings are convened in
which representatives of each component
gather to consider each other's views, with
the Solicitor General trying to reconcile
differences and fashion a single coherent
position.
These meetings are about the most
exciting and challenging thing the Solicitor
General gets to do. It is genuinely thrilling
to collaborate with a collection of
dedicated government lawyers each of
whom brings to the table the unique
perspective of the component he
represents for the purpose of trying to
arrive at a position that will fairly reflect
the views of the United States as a whole.
Sometimes it just cannot be done. But in a
surprisingly large percentage of cases, a
position can be developed that leaves
everyone satisfied or at least equally
dissatisfied. The beauty of the system is
that each government component reflects
a unique conception of on what
constitutes the interest of the United
States. In that way, the government acts as
a microcosm of the country as a whole,
mirroring the complexity and diversity of
American views.
The process often includes advocacy by
lawyers for other parties to the litigation
and sometimes by attorneys for other
persons or entities that are not directly
involved with the litigation but
nonetheless have an interest in the case or
the issue. The process always involves the
Solicitor General's independent evaluation
of the relative importance of each case
and the cost of pursuing it. As a party in
about forty percent of all cases in the
federal courts, the United States appeals
only a small fraction of the decisions it
loses, and it petitions for rehearing or
certiorari only rarely. Solicitors General
understand the cataclysmic effects that a
less-discriminating process would have on
the judicial system.
When an Act of Congress is challenged,
the process remains much the same, but
the calculus alters somewhat. The
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situation differs because a decision about
how to respond to a constitutional
challenge implicates in the most direct
way the Solicitor General's responsibility
to account for the interests of all three
branches of government.
In the unique context of a constitutional
challenge to legislation, the interests of the
Congress and the Executive are generally
pretty clear: they have spoken. And as a
result, at least when those interests do not
conflict with the Solicitor General's duty
to the courts, the Department of Justice
defends Acts of Congress in all but the
rarest of cases. Except in two well-
recognized circumstances, which I will
discuss momentarily, the Solicitor General
generally defends a law whenever
professionally respectable arguments can
be made in support of its constitutionality.
Unlike litigation decisions in other cases,
when an Act of Congress has been
challenged, the Solicitor General
ordinarily puts a heavy thumb on the
scale.
Vigorously defending congressional
legislation serves the institutional interests
and constitutional judgments of all three
branches. It ensures that proper respect is
given to Congress's policy choices. It
preserves for the courts their historic
function of judicial review. And it reflects
an important premise in our constitutional
system that when Congress passes a law
and the President signs it, their actions
reflect a shared judgment about the
constitutionality of the statute. In the
mine run of cases, it is fair to presume
that the Congress that passed the
legislation and the President who signed it
were of the view that the law conformed
to the Constitution as construed by the
Supreme Court. In such cases, Solicitors
General defer to Congress and the
President's articulation of the
constitutional "interests of the United
States," as reflected in the enactment.
They do not attempt to reach our own
best view of a statute's constitutionality,
rather, they try to craft a defense of the
law in a manner that can best explain the
basis on which the political branches'
presumed constitutional judgment must
have been predicated.
[There are two exceptions to this
presumption.] The first exception applies
when an Act of Congress raises separation
of powers concerns. It is not surprising
that the President and Congress
occasionally find themselves at odds
regarding the proper interpretation of
their own, and each other's, constitutional
powers. In that event, the Solicitor
General ordinarily defends the President's
powers and prerogatives, and Congress
traditionally appears as amicus to present
its own views.
The second exception to the general
principle of defending Acts of Congress
an exception that assumes great
significance in light of the Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence arises when
defending the statute would require the
Solicitor General to ask the Supreme
Court to overrule one of its constitutional
precedents. In that instance when a
contrary constitutional ruling is directly on
point the interests of the legislative and
judicial branches are in direct tension. On
the one hand, Congress has made a
constitutional judgment. Yet under
Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
has the final word on the meaning of the
Constitution. The Solicitor General has an
obligation to honor the important
doctrine of stare decisis and a duty to
respect the rulings of the Court. Those
responsibilities are at least commensurate
with the Solicitor. General's duty to
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respect congressional determinations
about a statute's constitutionality.
Most commonly, cases falling under this
exception involve statutes whose
constitutionality has been undermined by
Supreme Court decisions rendered after
the law's enactment. Congress, after all,
rarely defies a Supreme Court ruling. For
example, in recognition of the Court's
new jurisprudence, the Department of
Justice recently notified Congress twelve
times during a single year that, in light of
intervening judicial precedents, it could no
longer defend a statutory provision that
the legislature and the Executive might
have considered constitutional at the time
of enactment. [... ]





Copyright D 2001 North Carolina Law
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Government Lawyering: The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States
61Law & Contemp. Pmb. 165
1998
David A. Strauss
The Solicitor General is engaged in
advocacy, not impartial commentary or
advice, and the Court knows that. But the
Court has a significant community of
interests with the institutional agenda of
the federal government, including the
Solicitor General's Office. The Court does
not want to see the government unable to
perform its legitimate functions. Receivmig
a responsible account of what the
government thinks it needs to discharge
those functions an advocate's account,
but one intended to illuminate the
government's view of what it needs is a
great asset to the Court. When what the
Court receives from the Solicitor General
is instead an argument, or a judgment, that
is motivated by political concerns even
political concerns of the highest moral
order the Court is no longer getting the
kind of material it most needs, and the
community of interest between the Office
and the Court is eroded.
In addition, as long as the Office engages
in forms of advocacy that are familiar to
the Court defending the institutional
interests of the government, without
regard to the political agenda of the
Administration in power - the Court has a
good sense of the limits and value of the
advocacy it is receiving. Familiarity, in this
context, is a signal virtue. The Office will
function best, both in the achievement of
its own objectives and in helping the
Court do its job, when it seems to the
Court that it is seeing the same, familiar
Solicitor General's Office in every case
preferably, the same Solicitor General's
Office that it saw when the other political
party was in power. The Court can
discount for the Office's professional
biases and proceed accordingly. The Court
also knows that, to the extent the Office is
concerned with the government's
institutional interests, rather than the
Administration's political interests, the
Office has a stake in maintaining a long-
term relationship with the Court and will
act accordingly. The Office will not risk its
credibility for the sake of victory in a
single case.
When part of the work of the Office
responds to a particular Administration's
political agenda, the relationship between
the Office and the Court can come
unsettled. Many issues that come before
the Court are not high profile political
controversies like abortion but are
nonetheless potential opportunities for
the Administration to score political
points: areas like criminal law, civil rights,
environmental protection, antitrust, labor
law, and tax enforcement, for example. If
the Solicitor General's Office sometimes
takes positions because it is promoting the
Administration's agenda, the Court is then
entitled to wonder, in each of these areas,
whether it is hearing from the institutional
Office which is concerned primarily with
maintaining its relationship with the
Court, and with whose biases and
predilections the Court is familiar - or the
political Office, which may be addressing
not the Court but a very different
audience, and for whose tendencies and
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biases the Court will not have as good a
feel.
More importantly, lawyers concerned with
promoting a single Administration's
political agenda do not have the same
incentives to maintain their long-term
credibility with the Court. Once the
Solicitor General and his staff are free to
go beyond the institutional interests of the
government, and to advocate a political
agenda, they will naturally ask themselves:
Why should we husband our credibility
for institutional issues we care about less
or, worse still, for a subsequent
Administration instead of spending it on
our own political agenda? The point is not
that adherents to the Administration view
will engage in misleading or other
improper advocacy. It is that, given the
ongoing relationship between the Solicitor
General and the Court, the Solicitor
General must be selective in almost
everything he does: seeking certiorani,
stays, or summary reversals; using strong
rhetoric (for example, arguing that a case
seriously impairs the government's ability
to enforce the criminal laws); and so on. If
the Office's time horizon is four years,
and if the Solicitor General sees his
agenda as the pursuit of a small number of
politically salient causes, then he will have
an entirely different attitude toward this
task, and the Office's ability to perform its
institutional role will be weakened.
[David A- Strauss, a professor at the
University of Chicago Law School,
previously worked in the Solicitor
General's Office.]
Copyright o 1998 Law and Contemporary
Problems
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U.S. Changes Stance in Case On Obscenity
The New York Times
November 11, 1994
Linda Greenhouse
Stung by Congressional criticism of its
legal interpretation of a child-pornography
law, the Clinton Administration reversed
course in a brief filed with the Supreme
Court today and disavowed its previous
position that the law applied only to
depictions of nude children.
The filing of the brief, as well as a
statement accompanying it, disclosed an
unusual fissure in the top ranks of the
Justice Department. The brief was signed
by Attorney General Janet Reno and not
by Solicitor General Drew S. Days 3d, the
Government's top Supreme Court
advocate, whose narrower view of the
child-pornography law, as expressed in a
brief last year, unleashed a storm of
criticism on Capitol Hill.
All 100 Senators voted for a resolution
last year condemning the brief by Mr.
Days, and the crime bill that passed
Congress this summer contained a section
expressing the sense of the Congress that
the brief did not reflect Congressional
understanding of the scope of the 1978
law.
In the unusual statement with the brief
today, Ms. Reno praised as sound and
persuasive the interpretation of the law
adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Philadelphia. The appeals court, affirming
for the second time the conviction of a
Pennsylvania State University graduate
student, Stephen A. Knox, for having
ordered three videotapes of scantily
clothed young girls, said the law was not
limited to nudity.
It was that interpretation that Mr. Days
found impermissibly broad in the brief he
filed last year. He told the Supreme Court
then that both the plain meaning and the
legislative history of the law, which makes
it a crime to receive or distribute pictures
of minors engaged in a "lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area,"
showed that Congress meant to prohibit
only depictions of children who were
naked or whose genitals were visible
through tight or transparent clothing.
The brief Ms. Reno filed today said that
"neither nudity nor discernibility of the
genitals through clothing is a required
element of the offense." In her statement,
the Attorney General said: "I believe that
the Government must argue for that
legitimate interpretation of the statute,
which prohibits the receipt and posession
of child pornography to the maximum
extent allowed under the Constitution."
She also said, "The Solicitor General and I
have discussed this case in light of the
evidence and the law, and with great
attention to the institutional issues
affecting the Department of Justice." She
went on: "As I am ultimately responsible
for the positions taken by the Untied
States, the brief filed today adopts the
interpretation made by the Third Circuit,
which I believe to be the correct one. For
that reason, it bears my signature rather
than that of the Solicitor General."
In fact, no lawyer in the Solicitor
General's office signed the brief. It is
virtually unheard of for the Federal
Government to file a Supreme Court brief
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without the signature of any member of
the Solicitor General's office. Attorneys
General rarely if ever sign briefs
themselves. Mr. Days was traveling today
and did not return a telephone call seeking
comment.
The brief was greeted with glee by the
organizations that had led the opposition
to the earlier brief. John D. McMickle, a
lawyer for the national Law Center for
Children and Families, which led a
coalition of groups in filing a brief in the
case, said today that the Administration's
new position was "the result of one year's
worth of concerted effort and the Tuesday
elections." He added, "This case is the
first indication of how the Justice
Department and the Clinton
Administration will react in a conservative
world."
The brief was filed in response to the
Pennsylvania graduate student's second
Supreme Court appeal of his conviction,
for which he received a five-year sentence.
Last year, in response to the
Administration's initial brief, the Supreme
Court sent the case back to the Third
Circuit with instructions to reconsider the
conviction in light of the Government's
new position. The Third Circuit then
rejected the new interpretation and
reaffirmed Mr. Knox's conviction.








Until last week, Solicitor General
Theodore Olson had spent his first two
months in office quietly placing a more
conservative stamp on the Justice
Department's briefs before the Supreme
Court.
But with the Aug. 10 filing of a high-
profile brief that supports a federal
affirmative action program, Olson's less-
visible conservative advocacy may have
been eclipsed. The move could win the
administration praise for taking a middle
path, or open Olson and his boss,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, to
charges they have betrayed their
conservative roots.
"Given the players here, John Ashcroft
and Ted Olson, I'm not sure why this has
happened, except as a political
calculation," said Linda Chavez, president
of the Center for Equal Opportunity and,
briefly, President George W. Bush's
nominee for secretary of labor. "It's very
disappointing. When I discussed these
issues with President Bush at the time of
my nomination, I thought we were in
sync.
The filing came in Adarand Constructors
Inc. v. Mineta, No. 00-730, the latest
round in long-running litigation over a
Federal Highway Administration minority
set-aside program for highway
contractors, first enacted by Congress in
1990. After the Supreme Court first
blocked the program in 1995, Congress
re-enacted it, but the program was later
modified to ensure that only economically
disadvantaged firms benefited. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit
upheld the revised program, prompting
the white-owned Adarand firm to
challenge it again.
One day before President Bush took
office in January, Clinton administration
Solicitor General Seth Waxman urged the
Court not to disturb the 10th Circuit
ruling. But in March, the Court said it
would take up the issue again, prompting
intense discussions within the Bush
Justice Department about possibly
changing its position and dropping its
defense of the program.
On Aug. 10, the deadline for filing the
brief, the administration made it clear it
planned to defend the program. As of
press time, the text of the brief was not
available, but government sources
confirmed that it would not change sides
in the case.
Powerful factors weighed on the side of
maintaining a defense of the highway
program, says Washington University
School of Law professor Clark
Cunningham, who has filed a brief in the
case supporting neither side.
"One of the department's clients here, in a
sense, is Congress, which has reauthorized
this program, so you would expect the
solicitor general to abide by the wishes of
his clients," says Cunningham.
In addition, says Cunningham, the strong
identification of both Olson and Ashcroft
as opponents of affirmative action may,
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ironically, have pushed them to decide
they had to continue defending the set-
aside. "Their integrity as lawyers was
under scrutiny, to be sure that they would
not impose their personal beliefs on the
case, so they might have bent over
backward to defend it."
William Perry Pendley of Mountain States
Legal Foundation, longtime lawyer for
Adarand, also said last week that the
administration's position can be explained
as "a defense of Congress, which Ashcroft
said he would do during his confirmation
hearings."
Pendley said the brief was not a surprise.
"We've been through three presidents and
six secretaries of transportation on this,
and nothing has changed."
Chavez said politics was at work, noting
that many of the blacks and Hispanics
who have become active in the
Republican Party "got their start" with set-
aside and affirmative action programs like
the one at issue in Adarand.
But Chavez and others say there will be
opportunities before long for the
administration to redeem itself as other
affirmative action cases make their way to
the high court. Affirmative action
programs in higher education-which
Olson fought vigorously as a private
attorney-are at issue in a series of cases
that could get to the Court in the next
year or so.
Since taking office in June after a
contentious confirmation process, Olson
had taken positions that were generally
pleasing to conservatives, positions that
critics say the Clinton Justice Department
would not likely have advanced.
In Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, No. 00-1089, Olson sided
with the car manufacturer against
assembly line worker Ella Williams, who
successfully claimed that the carpal tunnel
syndrome she developed on the job
entitled her to accommodations under the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
Disabilities groups were angered by the
brief, which says the case should be
returned to lower courts.
Earlier, Olson filed a brief favoring an
Ohio school voucher program that allows
government monies to be used for
religious school tuition.
The brief was submitted in Zelman v.
Doris Simmons-Harris, No. 00-1751, even
before the Court announced whether it
would take up the case-an unusually early
stage for the government to become
involved.
"They didn't even wait for the Court to
act," says Robert Boston of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and
State, which opposes vouchers. "Things
really have changed at the Justice
Department."
Copyright @ 2001 by American Lawyer
Media, ALM LLC
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The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743
2000
Joseph D. Keamey and Thomas W. Merrill
The last century has seen little change in
the conduct of litigation before the United
States Supreme Court. The Court's
familiar procedures the October Term,
the opening-answering-reply brief format
for the parties, oral argument before a
nine-member Court - remain essentially as
before. The few changes that have
occurred, such as shortening the time for
oral argument, have not been dramatic.
In one respect, however, there has been a
major transformation in Supreme Court
practice: the extent to which non-parties
participate in the Court's decision-making
process through the submission of amicus
curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs.
Throughout the first century of the
Court's existence, amicus briefs were rare.
Even during the initial decades of this
century, such briefs were filed in only
about 10% of the Court's cases. This
pattern has now completely reversed
itself. In recent years, one or more anicus
briefs have been filed in 85% of the
Court's argued cases. Thus, at the close of
the twentieth century, cases without
amicus briefs have become nearly as rare
as cases with amicus briefs were at the
beginning of the century.
Attitudes within the legal community
about the utility and impact of amicus
briefs vary widely. Perhaps the most
common reaction among lawyers and
judges is moderately supportive. Amicus
briefs, it is said, can provide valuable
assistance to the Court in its deliberations.
For example, they can present an
argument or cite authorities not found in
the briefs of the parties, and these
materials can occasionally play a critical
role in the Court's rationale for a decision.
Alternatively, these briefs can provide
important technical or background
information which the parties have not
supplied. Those sharing this perspective
can point to the frequent citation of
amicus briefs in the Justices' opinions in
support of the supposition that the Court
often finds such briefs helpful.
Other members of the legal community,
however, offer a much more negative
assessment of amicus briefs. For example,
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit has written that the
amicus briefs filed in his court provide
little or no assistance to judges because
they largely duplicate the positions and
arguments advanced by the parties. Those
who share this assessment regard such
filings as largely a nuisance imposing
unwarranted burdens on judges and their
staffs with few, if any, mitigating benefits.
According to those who harbor this
negative assessment, the judicial system
would be improved if amicus filings were
prohibited or at least sharply curtailed.
Justice Scalia recently offered a third
perspective on the widespread filing of
amicus briefs. The occasion was Jaffee v.
Redmond, where the Supreme Court
recognized a "psychotherapist's privilege"
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In a dissenting opinion joined
in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia offered the following observation:
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In its consideration of this case, the Court
was the beneficiary of no fewer than 14
amicus briefs supporting respondents,
most of which came from such
organizations as the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychoanalytic
Association, the American Association of
State Social Work Boards, the Employee
Assistance Professionals Association, Inc.,
the American Counseling Association, and
the National Association of Social
Workers. Not a single amicus brief was
filed in support of petitioner. That is no
surprise. There is no self-interested
organization out there devoted to pursuit
of the truth in the federal courts. The
expectation is, however, that this Court
will have that interest prominently
indeed, primarily in mind. Today we
have failed that expectation, and that
responsibility.
In this Article, we present empirical
evidence designed to enhance our
understanding about the impact of amicus
curiae briefs on the Supreme Court. [...]
In terms of the influence of amicus briefs
on outcomes, our study uncovers a
number of interesting patterns. We find
that amicus briefs supporting respondents
enjoy higher success rates than do amicus
briefs supporting petitioners; that small
disparities of one or two briefs for one
side with no briefs on the other side may
translate into higher success rates but
larger disparities do not; that amicus briefs
cited by the Court appear to be no more
likely to be associated with the winning
side than briefs not cited by the Court;
and that amicus briefs filed by more
experienced lawyers may be more
successful than briefs filed by less
experienced lawyers. Among institutional
litigants that appear frequently before the
Court, we confirm the finding of other
researchers that the Solicitor General, who
represents the United States before the
Supreme Court, enjoys great success as an
amicus filer. We also track the amicus
records of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"),
and the States, and find that they enjoy
some success as amicus filers, although
less than the Solicitor General.
[...] [A]micus briefs do appear to affect
success rates in a variety of contexts. And
contrary to what the interest group model
would predict, we find no evidence to
support the proposition that large
disparities of amicus support for one side
relative to the other result in a greater
likelihood of success for the supported
party. In fact, it appears that amicus briefs
filed by institutional litigants and by
experienced lawyers filers that have a
better idea of what kind of information is
useful to the Court are generally more
successful than are briefs filed by irregular
litigants and less experienced lawyers. [... ]
[Tihe greater success associated with
amicus briefs supporting respondents can
be explained by the supposition that
respondents are more likely than
petitioners to be represented by
inexperienced lawyers in the Supreme
Court and hence are more likely to benefit
from supporting amici, which can supply
the Court with additional legal arguments
and facts overlooked by the respondents'
lawyers.
[Footnotes have been deleted.]
[Joeseph D. Kearney is a professor at
Marquette Law School; Thomas W.
Merrill is a professor at Northwestern
Law School]
Copyright © 2000 The Trustees of The
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Almost like flowers, dozens of brightly
colored legal briefs are delivered almost
daily to the chambers of the nine justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Amid these bouquets of color--the result
of the strict dictates of Court rules
mandating that the cover of every type of
brief be a specific shade--green frequently
stands out, representing the submissions
of "friends of the court."
In legal vernacular, these are amicus
curiae, but some Court observers have
described them disparagingly as "lobbyists
of the Court."
Supreme Court Rule 37 allows a nonparty
to file a brief in a case, with either the
consent of both parties or leave of the
Court, "that brings to the attention of the
Court relevant matter not already brought
to its attention by the parties."
With roots going back as far as ancient
Roman law, the amicus submission
originally was intended to provide a court
with impartial legal information that was
beyond its notice or expertise.
In modem Supreme Court practice,
however, the amicus brief has become a
form of third-party representation--a
means of advocacy for interest groups,
private individuals and business concerns
that may not be parties to a case but have
a very direct interest in it. That is a
development some Court observers find
troubling.
Amici often are "nothing more than
extensions of the parties," suggests
Professor Michael Rustad of Suffolk
University Law School in Boston. "They
have moved from being friends of the
Court to friends of the petitioner and
respondent."
The danger from this, says Rustad, who
has written on what he terms the
"selective distortion of amicus briefs," is
not that amici are advocates, but that "in
their advocacy they may misuse data or
misrepresent empirical findings to the
Court."
The potential for this kind of advocacy is
particularly high at the Supreme Court,
whose decisions often have a
determinative effect on cases involving
touchstone legal issues.
The vast majority of the cases that make it
to the Court's oral argument calendar are
now accompanied by at least one amicus
brief.
In the 1995-96 term, amicus briefs were
filed in nearly 90 percent of the cases the
Court decided. During the 1980-81 term,
by contrast, 71 percent of the Court's
cases decided by opinion had amicus
filings, and only 35 percent of the cases
decided in the 1965-66 term included such
briefs, according to a study by Bruce
Ennis at Jenner & Block in Washington,
D.C., who argues often before the Court.
Yet these figures do not fully account for
the numbers of groups seeking input with
the Court, since many amicus briefs are
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filed by coalitions of groups with a shared
interest in a case's outcome.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which
concerned state restrictions on abortion,
more than 85 "friends" filed amicus briefs.
During that same term, by comparison,
the civil rights case of Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989), concerning whether a cause of
action for racial harassment by an
employer existed under a portion of the
U.S. Code, drew fewer than 20 amicus
briefs.
Taken together, however, they
represented more than 100 public interest
groups and nearly half the members of
Congress.
Proliferating Groups
A number of reasons are offered for the
steady increase in amicus briefs filed with
the Court.
First, as Ennis notes, "there is an
increasing recognition in the public
interest and business communities that
Supreme Court decisions in a particular
case may have profound implications
beyond that case."
Another factor is the proliferation of
advocacy groups in recent decades,
according to Dean William L. Robinson
of the District of Columbia School of
Law, who chairs the ABA Standing
Committee on Amicus Curiae Briefs.
Indeed, amicus briefs today are filed by a
broad cross-section of groups and
individuals, each of whom has a specific
agenda and most of whom claim to
represent the public interest.
For many financially strained advocacy
groups, amicus briefs are a cost-effective
way to make a legal pitch to the highest
court in the land. Although good Supreme
Court briefs do not come cheaply, they
are much less costly than litigating a case
from scratch. "Pound for pound, it is as
big a bang for the buck as you can get,"
Ennis says.
These factors have led to the overuse--and
sometimes abuse--of the amicus process.
One public interest lawyer acknowledges
that filing an amicus brief in the Supreme
Court boosts the reputation of advocacy
groups or law firms, demonstrating not
only that they are capable of putting
together a brief, but also holding out their
special expertise, as if to say, "We're
important, we're players in the big league
of the Supreme Court."
As a result, Robinson suggests, "A large
number of amicus briefs just don't have
anything special to say beyond what the
parties are saying. They are being filed
only because an entity wants to assert
their views as an organization on a
matter."
The Court itself disfavors redundant
filings but does little to prevent them.
Rule 37.1 warns that an amicus brief that
does not bring new and relevant material
to the justices "burdens the Court and its
filing is not favored." And the Court
works informally to prevent duplication of
arguments by encouraging communication
among the amici.
In a few cases, the Court may deny leave
to file an arnicus brief. But leave of the
Court is not required if the parties agree
to the filing, which they routinely do
unless the prospective amicus is so
politically unpalatable or intends to
present arguments so outlandish that
neither side wants to be associated with it.
The Most Influential Amicus
The key question about amicus briefs,
once labeled "delusively innocuous," is
how influential they really are.
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Ultimately, the impact of an amicus will
depend on the intellectual quality of the
brief and what new arguments or
information it brings to the Court's
attention.
This was apparent last term, as a
seemingly benign amicus brief submitted
by Professor Laurence H Tribe of
Harvard Law School and several other
leading constitutional scholars appeared to
have a significant impact on Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's opinion for the
Court in Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039
(May 20, 1996), striking down a Colorado
voters' initiative that barred the enactment
of state and local laws or regulations
protecting homosexuals from
discrimination.
Though he never cited Tribe's brief,
Kennedy seemed to accept the proferred
argument that the amendment constituted
a per se violation of the equal protection
guarantee under the 14th Amendment.
In fact, Robinson explains, "It is very
unusual for the Court to cite an amicus
brief in its opinion, or for that matter even
the briefs of the parties."
More likely, the Court's recognition will
come as it did last term in United States v.
Winstar Corp., No. 95-865 (July 1, 1996).
Discussing a difference of opinion about
the government's policy for insolvent
thrift institutions, the Court in a footnote
cited as evidence remarks by the director
of the now-defunct Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corp. quoted in an
amicus brief submitted by the Franklin
Financial Group.
Notwithstanding its reluctance to identify
influential amici, the Court has
occasionally cited as a source for its
decision reasoning raised in an amicus
brief. Among those cases are Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the
justices applied the exclusionary rule to
the states, and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989), barring pre-emptory jury
challenges for reasons related to race.
The most influential amicus, observers
agree, is still the U.S. solicitor general. The
only federal official required by statute to
be "learned in the law," the "S.G." is both
the chief advocate before the Court for
the executive branch of the federal
government and an informal adviser to
the Court--the post has come to be
known as the "10th justice."
The solicitor general frequently is
requested by the Court to submit a brief
in cases in which the executive branch is
not a party. Even when not asked, the
solicitor general may submit a friend-of-
the-court brief without consent of the
parties or leave of the Court.
As the number of amicus briefs continues
to rise, there is a natural cry from some
corners for increased scrutiny or
regulation. Some, like Rustad, argue for a
panel of independent experts to assess the
veracity of claims and evidence in the
briefs.
Others, like Robinson, believe no change
is necessary because "the justices are able
to make a fairly quick judgment and
determine whether a particular amicus has
anything to add or whether they are just
reworking what the parties said."
For now, it seems unlikely that any major
changes are in store for the armicus
process. While that process is not perfect,
it encourages that a variety of views and
interests be heard on Supreme Court cases
while offering support for justices seeking
to sustain or sink a legal argument.
To paraphrase an adage: "With amici like
these, who needs inimici?"







[II. Effective Communication Between
Party and Amicus]
The amicus and its counsel can help the
party plan the party's strategy, and can
provide research, drafting, and editorial
assistance to the party. The amicus can
organize one or more moot courts, etc.
This assistance is a much neglected
resource that can be extremely useful.
In the amicus brief itself, support for a
party will usually take one of three forms:
A. Helping the Party Flesh Out
Arguments the Party is Forced to Make in
Summary Form
Because of page limits, or considerations
of tone and emphasis, parties are
frequently forced to make some of the
points they wish to make in rather
abbreviated form. A supportive amicus
can flesh out those points with additional
discussion and citation of authority. Or
the amicus can support points the party is
making by providing a detailed legislative
or constitutional history, a scholarly
exposition of the common law, or a
nationwide analysis of relevant state laws.
For example, in the recent case of Toll v.
Moreno, the World Bank submitted an
amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to
rule, on Supremacy Clause grounds, that
certain state statutes which disadvantaged
alien college students were
unconstitutional. The alien students
touched briefly on the Supremacy Clause,
but the thrust and greater portion of their
brief was necessarily concerned with their
equal protection and due process
arguments. The Court ruled for the
students, but it chose to decide the case
on the basis of the Supremacy Clause
theory that had been advocated primarily
by the amicus.
Similarly, in the Supreme Court's latest
round of abortion decisions, the plaintiffs
devoted only one paragraph in their brief
to the argument that nonphysicians
should be allowed to engage in abortion
counseling because they thought they
would probably lose that issue. Instead,
the plaintiffs chose to stress other
important issues they thought they had a
better chance to win. But the American
Psychological Association, as amicus,
marshaled empirical studies to show why
counseling by nonphysicians would help
to promote truly informed consent, and
the Court agreed.
B. Making Arguments the Party Wants to
Make But Cannot Make Itself
It frequently happens that a party wants a
particular argument to be made but is not
in a position to make that argument itself.
The party may simply lack credibility on
that issue, or it may be unable to make the
argument for political or tactical reasons.
For example, governmental entities often
feel compelled, for political reasons, to
argue for very broad rulings: eliminate the
exclusionary rule entirely, absolute
immunity for all governmental employees,
etc. But courts, including the Supreme
Court, are institutionally conservative and
usually prefer to decide cases on narrower
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grounds if possible. An amicus can
suggest those narrower grounds: qualify
the exclusionary rule rather than eliminate
it, distinguish a prior case rather than
overrule it, or dismiss certioran as
improvidently granted, among others.
A good example of this type of
cooperation is Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, in which San Diego sought to
exclude most billboards from designated
sections of the city, on grounds of traffic
safety and aesthetics. The billboards
carried primarily commercial messages,
but they occasionally carried political
messages as well. The billboard owners
were represented by an experienced and
extremely sophisticated Supreme Court
advocate. He knew the Court would be
closely divided, and would be more
troubled by the regulation's prohibition of
political speech than by its prohibition of
commercial speech. The billboard
owners, however, were not in a position
to argue credibly on behalf of political
speech because they did not themselves
engage in political speech; they simply
leased billboard space, primarily to
commercial speakers. Their lawyer
decided it would be important to
demonstrate to the Court that
organizations traditionally concerned with
the protection of political speech were
opposed to the San Diego ordinance, so
he asked the ACLU if it would file an
amicus brief emphasizing the political
speech aspects of the case, and the ACLU
agreed.
The Court, as expected, was closely
divided. Although a majority of the Court
agreed to a judgment striking down the
San Diego ordinance, only three other
Justices joined in Justice White's plurality
opinion. Those four thought the
ordinance was constitutional insofar as it
regulated only commercial speech, but
they struck down the entire ordinance
because it unconstitutionally regulated
political speech, and the commercial and
political regulations were not severable.
Given the closeness of this decision, it
seems clear that the billboard owners
advanced their interests by enlisting
amicus support.
C. Informing the Court of the Broader
Public Interests Involved, or of the
Broader Implications of a Ruling.
One of the most common forms of
anucus support is to inform the court of
interests other than those represented by
the parties, and to focus the court's
attention on the broader implications of
various possible rulings. Governmental
entities are uniquely situated to define and
assert the "public interest" and their views
as amicus will, therefore, carry substantial
weight. If a governmental entity is already
a party, amicus support from other
governmental entities will enhance the
credibility of the party's arguments.
[Footnotes have been deleted.]
[Bruce J. Ennis was one of the leading
members at the Supreme Court bar







Arguing a case before the Supreme Court
of the United States has always been the
Matterhorn of the legal profession: a
terrifying, exhilarating, career- crowning
half-hour ascent to the realm of the black-
robed law gods. But whatever it was
before, it is more so now. The Court's
plummeting docket and its intense, almost
manic questioning from the bench have
combined to fundamentally change
advocacy before the nation's highest
court. Competition for coveted arguments
is more intense. Massive preparation is
more imperative. And clients who might
have stuck with their local counsel before
are reaching more often for high court
specialists, the specialists say. The
Matterhorn has become Everest, so the
sherpas are in great demand. A statistical
survey by The American Lawyer of the
last five terms confirms the reemergence
of a Supreme Court bar the likes of which
has not been seen since the early days of
the republic when Henry Clay, Daniel
Webster, Francis Scott Key, and a handful
of other advocates argued day in and day
out at the Supreme Court. A scant 13
years ago, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
was able to state flatly there is no such
Supreme Court bar at the present time,
because he rarely saw a private practice
lawyer argue before him more than once a
term. But now, even with the justices
hearing only half the number of cases as
then, it is not unusual for a small group of
top specialists in private practice all white
males to argue one to three times a term.
Sidley & Austin's Carter Phillips argued
and ultimately won three cases in the
space of a month last term, and has
argued 12 cases in the last five terms. This
summer Microsoft Corp. signed Phillips
on to its defense team for its antitrust
journey through the Supreme Court. With
the supply of cases cut in half, the demand
among the dozen or so firms with serious
Supreme Court practices has become
intense. In a practice area that venerates
civility, lawyers are beginning to bump
into each other as they pursue clients. A
Massachusetts lawyer even went so far as
to sue Phillips several years ago for taking
an oral argument away from him in 1993.
(Phillips prevailed in the suit, however.)
Like fishermen going after a depleted
catch, lawyers are trolling further and
wider for the chance to argue before the
Supreme Court. Upstart solo practitioner
Thomas Goldstein is drawing
disapproving perhaps envious glances
from staid veterans for cold-calling
lawyers who have lost cases that might
attract Supreme Court attention.
Goldstein will be arguing two cases this
fall.
The drought of cases is also affecting the
solicitor general's office, which has always
attracted top talent by being able to offer
them the prospect of arguing multiple oral
arguments. Advocates from the SG's
office do still get substantial face time
with the justices but often in ten-minute
snippets as amucus curiae instead of the
full-blown 30- minute arguments that
were once common. All this fierce
competition takes place over what seems,
from the outside, like a dubious prize: a
half hour of jackhammering from justices
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who sometimes seem more interested in
making lawyers suffer than in hearing
what they have to say. Antonin Scalia toys
with lawyers. David Souter confuses them.
William Rehnquist snarls at them,
sometimes correcting their grammar. John
Paul Stevens asks the one question the
lawyer was not expecting. Stephen Breyer
waits until the end of their presentation to
pounce. And Ruth Bader Ginsburg? She
interrupts everyone else.
Lawyers who subject themselves to this
abuse universally describe it as fun, but it
sure doesn't look that way. No lawyer has
fainted during oral argument lately it
happened several times in the last century
but it seems only a matter of time.
Supreme Court argument is not a game
for the faint- hearted. A dozen years ago,
three or four of the nine justices were
content to listen to lawyers' arguments,
asking few questions. Now, all the justices
except Clarence Thomas arrive on the
bench with an irresistible urge to ask
questions lots of them. And even Thomas,
when he asks a question three or four
times a term, packs a punch aided by the
element of surprise. Nine prima donnas,
eight of whom are interested in talking
during oral argument, is how Laurence
Tribe, a professor at Harvard Law School
and a sometime advocate before the high
court, describes it. No Court in my
lifetime was remotely as active as today's
Court. Tribe has argued seven cases in the
last five terms. To help get lawyers in
shape to argue before the justices, the
Public Citizen Litigation Group,
Georgetown University Law Center's
Supreme Court Institute, the State and
Local Legal Center, and the National
Association of Attorneys General as well
as some of the top private firms run moot
courts throughout the term. With fewer
cases on the docket, the justices are more
prepared for every argument. It's an
extraordinarily hard court to argue before,
says Public Citizen's Alan Morrison,
whose Supreme Court Assistance Project
often coaches first-timers. Morrison has
argued four times in the last five terms
himself. Even the veterans say they've had
to ratchet up preparations for oral
arguments in speed as well as time. Subtle
changes in the Court's calendaring often
mean cases are set for argument more
quickly than before. For three weeks
before the argument, you don't do
anything else, says veteran advocate H.
Bartow Farr III, of Washington, D.C.'s
Farr & Taranto. You talk to your wife, but
you have a vacant look in your eyes,
because you are thinking about your
jurisdictional argument. Court clerk
William Suter helps relieve argument-day
stress with a friendly tour, briefing, and
handshake. He lets it be known that
justices are aware if a lawyer is before
them for the first time. Not that they are
any less inquisitive toward newcomers
than veterans. You get to talk maybe for a
minute and a half, if that, then it's off to
the races, says Hogan & Hartson' s John
Roberts, Jr. President Clinton's lawyer
Robert Bennett, of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, who usually can be
expected to dominate a conversation,
counted 35 interruptions from the justices
during his 15 minutes of argument on
behalf of President Clinton in the Paula
Jones case. I thought I could keep them
away from me for a minute, Bennett
recalled soon after the argument. But he
couldn't. Lawyers count themselves lucky
if they can get through their half hour still
standing. You argue the way I play tennis,
says Phillips. You do your best to get the
ball back to the other side. You're not
looking to slam it like Pete Sampras.
Jeffrey Sutton of Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue, a relatively new specialist on the
scene, prepares one- and two-sentence
answers to the questions he anticipates,
because he knows he'll be interrupted if
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he goes on longer than that. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has chided Scalia and Ginsburg
for cutting off lawyers during their
answers to questions, but they gleefully do
it again. It's the academic in me, Scalia
once confessed. The devil makes me do it.
The justices themselves seem to know
that a half hour before them today is not
the same experience it used to be. I'd be
scared to death to be a lawyer before the
Supreme Court today, Justice O'Connor
said at the recent annual conference for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. I don't know how you ever keep
up your train of thought. At the same
conference, O'Connor also dealt with a
question that seems to get asked every
time a justice appears in public: Do oral
arguments matter? Of course they do,
O'Connor replies echoing what every
other current justice has said at one time
or another. Justices don't arrive at oral
argument as blank slates, O'Connor
suggested. You've tentatively thought it
through. You think you know how you're
leaning, she said. A lawyer can shake that
confidence. The intensity and the
importance of the arguments seems to
have raised the stakes involved. Bad
performances at oral argument have
gotten lawyers fired and even sued in
recent years. During the now-legendary
1995 arguments in Shalala v. Whitecotton,
which involved the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, Wyoming attorney
Robert Moxley, of Cheyenne's Gage and
Moxley, was so rattled by the barrage of
questions from the bench some of which
were ambiguous that he began
contradicting himself in his answers. As
he tried to backpedal, a furious Rehnquist
asked him, How can you stand up there at
the rostrum and give these totally
inconsistent answers? Moxley apologized,
but Rehnquist said the answers made him
gravely wonder how well prepared Moxley
was.
Moxleys clients fired him the next day,
not waiting for the outcome of the case.
(They lost 9 to 0.) Moxley, who insisted he
was well prepared, said afterward that I
felt like I dropped out of a tall cow's ass.
Asked to explain the metaphor, he said,
The taller the cow, the bigger the pile. In a
more recent argument, a lawyer's erratic
performance before the Supreme Court
earned him a malpractice lawsuit. In
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
California fruit growers couldn't agree
about who should argue before the
Supreme Court in their First Amendment
challenge of a federal program that levied
fees against them for generic advertising
of California fruit. Fresno, California,
lawyer Thomas Campagne of Thomas E.
Campagne & Associates, who had
represented the growers in lower court
proceedings, won a corn toss over
University of Utah College of Law
professor Michael McConnell, a veteran
advocate before the high court. For a
sometimes bizarre and raucous half hour
in December 1996, Campagne only
glancingly mentioned the First
Amendment issues in the growers' case,
instead reprising his gripes about the
administration of the fruit promotion
program. In one verbal detour, he guessed
that Scalia wouldn't buy green plums
because you don't want to give your wife
diarrhea. Scalia sputtered, I've never seen
a green plum. Campagne lost the case, 7
to 2. After the argument one of the
growers, Dan Gerawan, hit Campagne
with a malpractice suit claiming his
Supreme Court arguments fell below the
standard of care. The suit and a cross-suit
filed by Campagne were settled out of
court. But one of the novel grounds in
Gerawan's lawsuit somehow signaled a
turning point and even spawned a law
review article. Campagne's malpractice,
according to Gerawan, included failure to
refer to a specialist, namely McConnell.
The Supreme Court specialist had arrived.
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The modem specialized Supreme Court
bar began forming around 20 years ago.
Some whimsically trace its beginning to a
Supreme Court rule change that stated the
Court looks with disfavor on any oral
argument that is read from a prepared
text. An oral argument could no longer be
a brief with gestures. Not long after,
Stephen Shapiro left the solicitor general's
office to launch a Supreme Court specialty
at Mayer, Brown & Platt. Soon Carter
Phillips brought solicitor general Rex Lee
to Sidley & Austin, a rival Chicago firm. A
smaller boutique Onek, Klein & Farr
(now Farr & Taranto) billed itself as a
Supreme Court specialist, though not
exclusively. A handful of other firms have
followed suit with Supreme Court and
appellate practices most of them
populated by former Court law clerks and
alumni of the solicitor general's office.
Those experiences count, giving lawyers
insight into the folkways of the Court and
the kinds of arguments that appeal to the
justices. There's no way to overstate the
value of that experience, says Phillips, a
clerk for the late Warren Burger. It's a
very warm environment if you've been
there before. Everyone says hello. In that
sense, the growth of the Supreme Court
specialist is not unlike the rise of the
Washington lobbyist, says University of
North Carolina political scientist Kevin
McGuire, who has studied both.
Corporations look for Washington-based
lobbyists for their expertise on how the
executive and legislative branches operate.
I don't think folks are aware of the extent
to which that happens with the judicial
branch, too, McGuire says. And the
strategy works. To find out if clients did
better when they hired these insiders,
McGuire totaled up the number of former
clerks who appeared on briefs on both
sides in 178 cases heard by the Court.
Parties that listed two more former clerks
than their adversaries won 83 percent of
the time. It doesn't always pay to hire a
Supreme Court specialist. In a recent talk
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recalled a
bankruptcy case from last term in which
both lawyers were novices, but they did a
heck of a good job. Justices are not
experts in bankruptcy law, she explained,
so it was beneficial to have lawyers before
them who practiced bankruptcy law and
could answer nuts-and-bolts questions
that Washington Supreme Court
advocates might not know. O'Connor did
not mention names, but the case she
referred to was Hartford Underwriters v.
Union Planters Bank G. Eric Brunstad,
Jr., of the Hartford office of Boston's
Bingham Dana, who argued for the
underwriters, welcomed O'Connor's
comment. There's something to be said
for a generalist like Carter Phillips, but
when you are asking the justices to delve
into an arcane area of the law like
bankruptcy, I think it pays to have the
bankruptcy experts argue it. Most cases,
according to the numbers, are still argued
by lawyers who are standing in front of
justices for the firt or second time. But
veterans say the trend is running their
way. Clients are more sophisticated, and
they are far more likely to look for a
specialist than before, says Phillips, whose
bill for a Supreme Court case, start to
finish, can come close to $500,000. Clients
who don't reach for Phillips may seek out
John Roberts, Jr., at Hogan & Hartson, or
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's Theodore
Olson, or Charles Cooper at Cooper
Carvin & Rosenthal all former Supreme
Court clerks with solid Reagan or Bush
administration credentials. Others at the
top include Alan Morrison at Public
Citizen Litigation Group, Harvard's
Laurence Tribe, or Walter Dellinger at
O'Melveny & Myers. And then there's
Thomas Goldstein, the boldest newcomer
on the scene. Daily sweeps of lower court
decisions help him spot cases that reflect a
split between circuits and that, as a result,
might appeal to the Supreme Court for
62
review. He then calls the lawyer who lost
below sometimes being the first to suggest
the possibility that a Supreme Court
appeal might succeed. Other top firms
such as Mayer, Brown & Platt (see
Carving The Niche, page 86) occasionally
call potential clients out of the blue, too
but they wait until after the Court has
granted review. Tom's method of
discerning conflicts among the circuits is
ingenious. My hat's off to him, says
veteran advocate Charles Cooper of
Goldstein. But I am still not comfortable
with cold-calling potential clients. We wait
for the phone to ring. Adds John Roberts,
Jr., of Hogan & Hartson: If I'm going to
have heart bypass surgery, I wouldn't go
to the surgeon who calls me up. I'd look
for the guy who's too busy for that.
Harvard's Laurence Tribe, who has a
loose alliance with Goldstein for Supreme
Court cases, says, There's a certain
amount of hypocrisy in the criticism of
Goldstein. If he alerts someone to a
circuit split, he is performing a service by
giving the Court an opportunity to review
an issue of importance.
And Goldstein is getting the last laugh.
After taking on his early cases for free,
clients are calling Goldstein instead of the
other way around, and he is charging for
his services though at rates below those of
the big firms. Hiring Goldstein to take a
case start-to-finish will cost about
$75,000, and some of the fee might be
contingent on success. The Supreme
Court specialists are a mild-mannered
bunch, by and large. Not a Johnnie
Cochran or Gerry Spence among them,
reflecting the Supreme Court's vast
preference for lawyers with nimble minds
over lawyers given to grandiloquence.
Don't make the jury argument! Justice
O'Connor pleaded with practitioners in a
recent public appearance. One thing that
doesn't work with this Court is a great
debating style, says Dellinger, a former
acting solicitor general. A focused but
conversational style is what they want. An
Arkansas lawyer who brought an apple
and a Bible to the Supreme Court as
props for his argument in a tax case last
term he was arguing that his client had not
yet bitten the forbidden fruit flopped
badly. A New York lawyer who cracked
jokes and answered a Rehnquist question
with a cheery Yes, sir, got a dressing-down
from Rehnquist: I suggest you adjust your
entire demeanor toward this Court. The
lawyer won anyway.
The circle of Supreme Court specialists
also includes no women or minonties.
Among nongovemment lawyers, no
woman or minority member has argued
more than two cases in the last five terms.
Why is this so? I don't know. It's just
going to take time, says Maureen
Mahoney. A former Rehnquist clerk who
heads Latham & Watkins's appellate
practice, Mahoney argued one case in the
last five terms. I certainly believe all the
justices admire effective advocacy from
women as much as from men. But they
sometimes don't admire what women
wear. As an assistant solicitor general,
Beth Brinkmann has argued 12 times in
the last five terms, more than any other
woman. For a 1996 argument, Brinkmann
had the temerity to wear a conservative
brown business suit. Not long after, her
then-boss Walter Dellinger got a note
from Rehnquist reporting that the justices,
who had apparently conferred about the
matter, did not feel that brown was a
suitable color. (This from a chief justice
who wears gold stripes on each sleeve of
his black robe.) Dellinger wrote Rehnquist
back, defending Brinkmann and
respectfully pointing out that not enough
women had been in the SG's office for
long enough to establish a sartorial norm.
Women in the solicitor general's office
were miffed at the episode, which was
soon dubbed Bethgate. But they remained
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silent, and they acquiesced to the chief's
wishes. Defying the chief justice is not a
good career move. Now the women of
the solicitor general's office wear black.
Copyright * 2000 American Lawyer
Newspaper Group, Inc.
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Insider know-how provides an edge -- at a
price.
After he persuaded the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear his client's important
forfeiture challenge, Stefan B. Herpel, an
Ann Arbor, Mich., sole practitioner,
essentially shut down his practice for six
months while he prepared for oral
argument.
He also incurred about $ 20,000 in debt
that he is still repaying and wrote off a fee
that would have exceeded $ 200,000 --
had his client been able to pay -- for the
roughly 2,000 hours he ultimately put into
the case.
"I think it's pretty clear that without an
attorney willing to do this pro bono, she
could not have prosecuted the
constitutional claim," he says of Tina
Bennis, his client. The Michigan woman
brought the thorny issue of the "innocent
owner" in forfeitures as part of her suit to
reclaim a 1977 Pontiac used by her
husband for a liaison with a prostitute.
While Mr. Herpel was toiling after hours
in empty University of Michigan law
school classrooms, cajoling security
guards for a little more time, the Chubb
Insurance Co., in a different case, was
unhappily seeking a lawyer to handle a
Supreme Court challenge involving its
insured, the Center for Humanities Inc., in
New York.
Veteran high court litigator Theodore B.
Olson, of the Washington, D.C., office of
Los Angeles' Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
L.L.P., stepped into that case after review
was granted. He faced an accelerated
briefing schedule and oral arguments. But
after applying his own and the firm's
considerable appellate muscle, he won,
collecting a fee that was reportedly just $
150,000 less than the $ 450,000 award
Chubb's insured was told to pay.
"The fee was disproportionate to what
was at stake in the case, but not to what
was at stake globally," insists Mr. Olson.
Those stakes involved the power of
federal appellate courts to review
excessive jury verdicts. Intent on tort
reform, big business, like the insurance
industry, had tagged the case a "must
* ifwin.
A 'Supreme' Elite
Messrs. Herpel and Olson are members of
the Bar of the Supreme Court. But Mr.
Olson brought something more, some
court observers argue. He is a member of
a select cadre of high court starts -- call it
the "inner circle" -- to whom parties are
increasingly turning because of their
familiarity with the ways of the court and
their track records.
The choice, however, can be a costly one.
For the full range of services, fees and
costs can run as high as half a million
dollars a case, a price some are willing to
pay.
"If you're in the Supreme Court and have
$ 5 million at stake, it's rational to spend
that extra $ 100 000 to have me or Ken
Geller thinking about your case," says
Andrew L. Frey, of the Washington, D.C.,
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office of Chicago's Mayer, Brown & Platt,
who, like the firm's Mr. Geller, is a former
deputy solicitor general and a member of
the inner circle. "The quality of the
lawyering makes a tremendous
difference."
At the Supreme Court, as in most of life,
there is no level playing field, adds Mr.
Frey. "In the Supreme Court, the only
thing that matters is to get the best lawyer
to present your case effectively," he
explains. "It's not just money, but
knowing who the right people are. And, it
is not necessarily true the most expensive
are the best."
Emerging Bar
When he and former Solicitor General
Rex E. Lee decided to build a Supreme
Court practice in 1985 at the Washington,
D.C., office of Chicago's Sidley & Austin,
recalls Carter G. Phillips, "there were a
couple of practitioners who were repeat
practitioners before the court, but there
was no real systematic effort to develop
Supreme Court practices. We started
from Day One thinking about how to
develop a genuine Supreme Court
practice.
In 1985, the high court had 175 cases on
its docket, and "Rex and I were just about
the only game in town," says Mr. Phillips,
a former assistant to the solicitor general
and high court clerk In 1995, the court
had a docket of about 80 cases, and "just
about every firm in town has a Supreme
Court practice," he chuckles ruefully.
As the public has grown more aware of
the existence of specialized Supreme
Court practices, Mr. Phillips says, "there's
much greater receptivity or even an
activist approach by general counsel,
attorneys general or others in the position
of hiring outside counsel to think, when
they have a case in the Supreme Court,
maybe they should hire someone
experienced."
Today's inner circle, whose members are
based primarily in Washington, D.C.,
represents something of a resurgence of
the "elite community of lawyers" that
dominated Supreme Court practice about
200 years ago, Duke University Prof.
Kevin T. McGuire wrote in his 1993
book, "The Supreme Court Bar: Legal
Elites in the Washington Community."
Many of the current members are former
high court clerks or former attorneys in
the Office of the Solicitor General, he and
others say. And through their repeated
appearances before the justices and their
insiders' understanding of the institution,
they too act as gatekeepers for the high
court, shaping petitions for certiorari,
marshaling amicus brief support and
arguing their views of doctrine.
A rough survey of groups active in the
high court, such as the Washington Legal
Foundation, and Supreme Court
practitioners themselves as to who are the
best in town produces a relatively
consistent list of names. They include
Messrs. Olson, Frey, Geller and Phillips,
as well as Bruce Ennis, Donald Verilli and
Paul Smith, of the D.C. office of
Chicago's Jenner & Block; Bartow Farr
and Richard Taranto, of D.C's Farr &
Taranto; Alan Morrison, of Public Citizen
Litigation Group; Kirkland & Ellis'
Kenneth W. Starr, and Timothy B. Dyk,
of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. Named
as "up and comers" are Hogan &
Hartson's John Roberts, Gibson Dunn's
Thomas Hungar and Latham & Watkins'
Maureen Mahoney.
Because the high court has a limited
universe of cases, every case gets close
review by justices and clerks, says David
Vladeck, litigation director of Public
Citizen Litigation Group and a Supreme
Court practitioner for nearly 20 years.
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"While good lawyering can be a real plus,
bad lawyering is not necessarily the death
knell it is in other courts," he says.
By and large, he adds, the lawyers in the
inner circle "have well-deserved
reputations. They produce a very high-
quality product, and they're generally quite
on target in terms of trying to tailor their
arguments to what the court may be
prepared to do."
The Tab
The cost of Supreme Court work can vary
tremendously, most high court regulars
agree. It depends on everything from the
complexity of the issue raised to whether
the client is petitioning for or opposing
review to demands placed on counsel by
media attention.
Flexible Fees









lthough some say they
a flat fee in the
Others, such as Mayer
are willing to negotiate
client. He did for
in last term's major
challenge, BMW of
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589
But there are ranges, says Mr. Phillips.
Petitions for certiorari generally run $
25,000-$ 40,000. "The more cert-worthy
your issue," he says, "frankly the less
expensive it is. If you have a square
conflict in the circuits, you don't have to
gild the lily, just say it."
Amicus briefs at the cert stage usually run
about $ 10,000 at his shop; a brief in
opposition to certiorari, $ 5,000-$ 10,000;
reply briefs, particularly at the cert stage,
when there is very little time to complete
them, about $ 5,000; and oral arguments,
$ 10,000-$ 20,000.
The more expensive variables come into
play at the merits stage. Amicus briefs
should be less than $ 50,000, he says. But
for a party's brief, he adds, "the range is
just all over the lot. Sometimes it's as little
as $ 75,000 or as much as a couple of
hundred thousand dollars."
Mr. Phillips says none of his firm's 65
cases has produced a bill in excess of $ 1
million. But Mayer Brown's Mr. Frey says
that with some high court practitioners
billing $ 300-$ 400 per hour, a $ 500,000
tab is not unreachable or unreasonable.
"It really does depend enormously on the
complexity of the case and the degree to
which the lawyers already know the
substantive law," he says. "You may have
huge areas to be researched and if the case
is big enough, it's worth doing."
Gibson Dunn's Mr. Olson says last term's
Gasperini v. The Center for Humanities,
116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996), was big enough
and worth doing. That constitutional
challenge led advocates back into
common-law history to answer the
question of whether the Seventh
Amendment bars federal appellate courts
from reviewing allegedly excessive jury
awards.
Two major factors contributed to his large
fee, he explains: an accelerated briefing
schedule -- "The work had to be done in a
relatively compressed period, which
[rather than keeping costs down] means
you have to scramble and put more
people to work" -- and a complex
constitutional question, which required
much historical research.
"We did an enormous amount of research
into 17th century cases, which are hard to
find and understand," he recalls. "I must
have read the appropriate material in
Blackstone dozens of times. This was not
a run-of-the-mill case."
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Mr. Olson's opponent, Jonathan S. Abady,
of New York's Beldock Levine &
Hoffman L.L.P., had never made an
appellate argument and had litigated the
case with major assistance from his
cousin, Samuel Abady, of New York's
Law Offices of Samuel Abady. He was
working on contingency because his
client, a photojournalist, was not
financially prepared to take a case to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
After the high court granted review,
Samuel Abady had to leave the country to
handle some international litigation, and
Jonathan Abady turned to three close law
school friends for help.
"Between us and Sam's office, we put in
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of
essentially uncompensated time," he
recalls.
That degree of effort is required in the
Supreme Court, according to Mr. Abady
and veteran high court practitioners.
"This is the end of line," says Mr. Olson,
"and the only way to do it is in the very
best way you can, which means a lot of
preparation and very carefully written
briefs."
Being Prepared
And there is the need to be prepared for
any tangent taken by a justice. For
example, two terms ago in Coors Brewing
Co. v. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995),
Jenner & Block's Bruce Ennis was asked
to explain the brewing process for
different kinds of beer -- hardly central to
his First Amendment argument, but
something he was able to do.
As Mr. Abady and most newcomers to the
high court soon discover, there are
numerous lawyers eager to help them
carefully prepare -- but generally for a fee.
"When I took my case to the district
court, no one cared, and when I took it to
the 10th Circuit, no one cared, but when I
got to the Supreme Court, we had
numerous letters from D.C. firms and the
surrounding area offering to do the
argument for $ 48,000 -- $ 50,000," recalls
Linda D. King, a sole practitioner from
Wichita, Kan., who argued this term's
O'Gilvie v. U.S. 95 -- 96, involving the
taxability of certain punitive damages
awards.
Unless a client is independently wealthy,
Mr. Abady believes, he or she has very
little chance of being able to pay for the
efforts necessary for a Supreme Court
case, in which, as Ms. King discovered,
printing costs alone can top $ 7,000. "It's
extremely difficult to level the playing
field against these huge corporations that
have almost unlimited funds."
Pro Bono Help
But help is available. Mr. Abady got it
from a group of leading constitutional and
civil procedure scholars, such as Harvard's
Arthur Miller, and from the Supreme
Court Project of Public Citizen Litigation
Group.
"We got a lot of support because we had a
burning constitutional issue," says Mr.
Abady. "But many cases -- in fact, a high
percentage at the Supreme Court -- are
not as interesting as ours, and, depending
on the issue, it might be difficult to get
that kind of support."
Through its own cases and its Supreme
Court Project, Public Citizen is an
important institutional counterweight to
the resources of corporate litigants at the
high court. Public Citizen has a lawyer
who reads every civil petition filed and
summarizes them for its senior lawyers,
who select cases they think deserve their
assistance.
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The project is time-consuming and costly,
says Mr. Vladeck, "but we do it because
we observe time and again that important
questions are presented to the court by
lawyers who either are not particularly
skilled or didn't quite get it."
Mr. Abady, Ms. King and Mr. Herpel,
who handled Tina Bennis' car forfeiture
case, all accepted uncompensated help
from Public Citizen and called it
invaluable.
There are other counterweights to
inexperience and lack of resources in the
high court. Most members of the inner
circle have discounted Supreme Court
work and taken cases pro bono. Several
of the big firms regularly put together
moot courts for outsiders making their
first high court appearances. And some
organizations, such as the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the Institute for Justice and the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
help with brief-writing and moot courts.
Last term, the NACDL organized moot
courts for Mr. Herpel and Ann German, a
sole practitioner from Libby, Mont., a
former logging town of about 2,500
people in the state's northwest corner.
Ms. German represented convicted
murderer James Egelhoff in Montana v.
Egelhoff, 95-210.
After Montana won high court review,
Ms. German -- like Mr. Herpel -- basically
told her paying clients to go away and
come back in three months. Unlike Mr.
Herpel, she says, she was able to do that
because she was a court-appointed
attorney, earning $ 40 per hour for out-of-
court work and $ 50 per hour for in-court
work
Both she and Mr. Herpel said they were
able to shoulder the financial burden only
because they had either no dependents or
few economic demands of any other kind.
"Someone in my situation with many
financial demands just couldn't do it," Ms.
German insists.
The economic hardship is why Ms.
German was "annoyed as hell" that
Montana's attorney general, with all of his
inhouse appellate talent, hired Sidley &
Austin to assist him. Asst. Federal Public
Defender Daniel Donovan in Great Falls
found it curious, too, and asked why in a
letter to Attorney General Joseph P.
Mazurek.
Since he and his staff "carried the laboring
oars" in the appeal, Mr. Mazurek
responded, he initially didn't intend to put
the names of Sidley's attorneys on his
brief. "However, we were advised by
several experienced Supreme Court
advocates that including the names of the
Sidley & Austin attorneys on the brief
would probably catch the attention of the
Court and provide further evidence that
our case was a serious one," he wrote.
Montana paid Sidley $ 11,794 for its input
and name -- almost half what Ms. German
received for her high court work
Fate of the Court-Appointed
The high court playing field is perhaps
least level in criminal cases, where an
inexperienced, court-appointed attorney
comes up against the Office of Solicitor
General, says Mayer Brown's Mr. Frey.
"In those instances, the defendant is at a
tremendous disadvantage," the former
deputy solicitor general says.
To counter that imbalance, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
several years ago approached Sidley &
Austin's Mr. Phillips for advice on
improving the high court advocacy skills
of federal public defenders. Today,
whenever a public defender has a high
court case, Mr. Phillips gets a call from the
public defender in Houston telling him
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who needs help, and he offers the "gamut
of services," from brief writing to moot
courts.
"I have 16 former Supreme Court clerks
and 30-40 people who spend time
thinking about appellate issues," says Mr.
Phillips. "On a regular basis, criminal law
is not a big-ticket item in a corporate firm.
This provides an opportunity for our
people. It made sense to me."
Surprisingly, several members of the
"outer circle" who decided against giving
their cases to inner circle members, and
who ultimately lost, voice no regrets about
the decision and the personal cost of
going it alone.
"I don't think we lost because the other
side had more resources than we did,"
says Mr. Herpel. "While there are
obviously some extremely able Supreme
Court practitioners, I don't think it's
essential to have one. But you really do
need a committed advocate and someone
who really knows the case."
Andrew W. Bolt II, of Birmingham, Ala.,
does have lingering regrets, but for the
opposite reason. He and his co-counsel in
last term's BMW punitive damages case
hired veteran Supreme Court advocate
Michael Gottesman, of Georgetown
University Law Center, and two other
attorneys -- "for well over six figures" -- to
defend their $ 2 million punitive award
against BMW, which was represented by
Mayer Brown's Mr. Frey.
"We felt we didn't have much choice
because the other side seemed to have
half the lawyers on the East Coast
working for them," recalls Mr. Bolt.
"Gottesman and the other guys were as
good as anybody could want to find; they
are as smart as they come. But I'm not
sure there's ever a lawyer who knows a
case like the one who tried it, and I don't
know that they brought the same level of
passion as those toiling out in the field
these many years."
But a lot of cases that get to the Supreme
Court are "incredibly difficult," notes
Public Citizen's Mr. Vladeck, "and it
would be wrong to suggest that . . .
knowing the justices' positions intuitively,
as a handful of these practitioners does,
doesn't help. "This is not easy stuff. If
you talk to people who follow the
Supreme Court, I think it is very difficult
to see with anything approaching clarity
where the court is headed. These lawyers
are called on to do that, and each has
won.
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